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INTRODUCTION

Americans have always taken particular pride in the right to
be free from government intrusion into their homes and,
metaphysically speaking, their minds. The authors of the Bill of
Rights carved out this protective zone in the Fourth and Fifth
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Amendments to the United States Constitution.' While modern
Fourth Amendment protection has most often been interpreted as a
privacy-based protection, 2 the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause 3 protects against government compulsion to implicate oneself
in the commission of a crime. The development of the Fifth
Amendment privilege reflects many of this nation's "fundamental
values and most noble aspirations." 4 These values and aspirations
help protect individual citizens from excessive governmental intrusion
and were foremost in the Framers' minds. 5 By the same token, the
proper enforcement of our laws is often dependent upon the
introduction of incriminating evidence "independently secured
through skillful investigation." 6 Rule of law is no less important to the
preservation of a free society than freedom from government
intrusion. 7 The interplay between these competing interests has
1.
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE
L.J. 393, 394 (1995) ("Fourth and Fifth Amendment law are the traditional guardians of a
particular kind of individual privacy-the ability to keep secrets from the government."). The
Fourth Amendment provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself..." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2.
See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1966) ("We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than
property ....).
3.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). The Court mentioned several
values, including:
...our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which
dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load[;] ... our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life[;] ...our distrust of
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a
shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
5.
See id.
6.
See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976) (citing Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 54 (1949)).
7.
See, e.g., Murphy, 378 U.S. at 93-94 (White, J., concurring) ("Among the necessary and
most important powers of the States as well as the Federal Government to assure the effective
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produced much of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning the
privilege against self-incrimination. The Court has routinely held that
a suspect's oral testimony, usually in the form of a 8 compelled
confession, may not be used as evidence against the suspect.
This privilege has not been limited to oral testimony. Most
often in the context of white-collar criminal prosecutions, the Supreme
Court has held that the act of producing subpoenaed documents that
incriminate the producing party may have communicative aspects
that warrant Fifth Amendment protection. 9 These white-collar crimes
are "often buried and corrosive ventures where the prosecutor and the
grand jury have little more than a hunch to direct their attention in
the first instance." 10 Therefore, the government typically makes liberal
use of the subpoena power in connection with a white-collar crime
grand jury investigation." The grand jury has at its disposal the
power of the subpoena duces tecum, which summons an individual to
12
produce documents before the grand jury.
In certain instances, this communicative act of producing
subpoenaed documents implicates the Fifth Amendment's SelfIncrimination Clause. The current Supreme Court act of production
jurisprudence holds that the Fifth Amendment protects the person
asserting the privilege only from compelled self-incrimination when
faced with a subpoena or summons to turn over incriminating
documents. 13 The act of production doctrine protects those
communicative aspects of compliance with a subpoena, independent of
the contents of the documents themselves. 14 In other words, as long as
the contents of the self-incriminating documents were voluntarily
functioning of government in an ordered society is the broad power to compel residents to testify
in court or before grand juries .... ").
8.
See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-35 (2000) (holding that the
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), established concrete constitutional
guidelines regarding custodial police interrogations that govern the admissibility of oral
statements made during such interrogations).
9.
See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) ("The act of producing
evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly
aside from the contents of the papers produced.").
10. H. Richard Uviller, Fisher Goes on the Quintessential FishingExpedition and Hubbell is
off the Hook, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 334 (2001).
11.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE ETAL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.12, at 459 (3d ed. 2000).

12. Id. A subpoena duces tecum is "[a] subpoena ordering the witness to appear and to bring
specified documents or records." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (7th ed. 1999). The definition
derives from the Latin meaning of "duces tecum," which is "[blring with you." LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 515.
13. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 396-97; accord United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection
for the contents of private papers of any kind").
14.

See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11.
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prepared, requiring the individual to turn over these documents is not
15
the same as forcing that person to be a witness against himself.
In 2000, the Supreme Court took up the act of production
doctrine in a case stemming from the Whitewater Independent
Counsel's investigation and prosecution of former Deputy Attorney
General Webster L. Hubbell. 16 The Supreme Court, in United States v.
Hubbell, affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit (the "D.C. Circuit") dismissing
Hubbell's case on the ground that the Independent Counsel was
unable to demonstrate with "reasonable particularity" that he had
prior awareness of the documents sought when he issued the
subpoena duces tecum. 17 The Independent Counsel "was not
investigating tax-related issues when he issued the subpoena," and he
learned about Hubbell's crimes through the investigation into whether
18
Hubbell might have obstructed the Whitewater investigation.
Therefore, the documents produced by Hubbell provided the
"necessary linkage" between his subpoena and subsequent
indictment. 19
As a development in the doctrine, the Hubbell decision is not a
major departure from the Court's decision in Fisher, generally
considered to be the authoritative formulation of act of production
jurisprudence. 20 The Fisher Court held that "[t]he act of producing
15. See id. "Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers
demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer." Id. at 410. However, the Court
emphasized that the taxpayer in Fisher added "little or nothing to the sum total of the
Government's information by conceding that he in fact [had] the papers." Id. at 411. Therefore,
according to the Court, enforcement of the summons would not offend the privilege against selfincrimination but was instead a matter of "surrender." Id. (citing In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279
(1911)).
16. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 30 (2000).
17. Id. at 32-34.
18. Id.; see also United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Using the
contents of the documents Hubbell turned over to the grand jury, the Independent Counsel
identified and developed evidence that culminated in the prosecution at issue in this case.").
19. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 33 (quoting Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 581).
20. Compare William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 865 (2001) (noting that "[tihe Supreme Court
appeared to conclude [in Hubbell] that unless the government knows-really knows-of a
particular document's existence, a subpoena's target is free to refuse to turn the document over,"
which is the essential holding of Fisher (emphasis added)), and infra Part IV (noting the
conspicuously limited response to the Hubbell decision from the lower courts and from
commentators), with Uviller, supra note 10, at 335 (arguing that "the pragmatic implications for
future exploratory investigations [of the Hubbell decision] are dire"), and Lance Cole, The Fifth
Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal Documents After United States v. HubbellNew Protection for Private Papers, 29 Am. J. CRIM. L. 123, 129 (2002) ("After Hubbell,
prosecutors no longer can use a grand jury subpoena duces tecum and a grant of 'act of
production immunity' to compel production of documents by an individual who is subject or

2003]

FISHING FOR CLARITY

617

evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative
aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers
produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the
existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by
the taxpayer."21 However, in a concurrence in Hubbell, Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, invited a reexamination and
reconsideration of the "original meaning of the Fifth Amendment's
22
Self-Incrimination Clause" and thus the rationale of the Fishercase.
Justice Thomas suggested that the privilege protects against "the
compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but of any
incriminating evidence."23 The phrase "any incriminating evidence" is
surprisingly broad, because it indicates that any person in possession
of potentially incriminating documents could refuse to turn them over
pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. The individual could simply
decide that she did not want to hand over the documents, and the
government would be unable to force her to do otherwise without a
grant of use immunity. 24 What is even more surprising about this
suggestion is the fact that, according to the Framers' understanding of
the privilege, it may be exactly right.
Justice Thomas's concurrence did not resolve the issue,
however. The opinion left open the outcome of a case in which the
government has specific knowledge of a document's existence and
knows its contents, but does not know the document's location. In
other words, the only information the government is asking the target
of the investigation to provide is the location of the document. 25 In this
hypothetical test case, the prosecution cannot obtain a warrant
because they are unable to identify the document's location with
reasonable particularity (they also may be unable to demonstrate
probable cause). They would therefore have to use a narrowly tailored
subpoena to procure the document. The subpoena attempts to compel
the individual to turn over the document to the prosecution. Can the
government use the subpoena power to compel the individual to turn
target of a grand jury investigation without risking the loss of their ability to prosecute that
individual.").
21. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); see also Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 567
("Whether addressed to oral testimony or to documentary evidence, the doctrine necessitates a
showing of: i) the compulsion; ii) of testimony; iii) that incriminates.").
22. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. See infra note 79. Use immunity allows a court to compel the subject of a criminal
investigation to turn over incriminating documents in exchange for a promise by the government
not to use those documents as evidence in the target's prosecution.
25. Therefore, the document's location is the only information the government cannot
identify with reasonable particularity. See supra notes 17-19.
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over the document? Does the breadth of a subpoena duces tecum really
matter? Should it?
In the next case that the Supreme Court faces presenting an
act of production issue, the Court should establish a clear precedent
that regardless of the breadth of a subpoena request, any such request
that compels an individual to produce incriminating documents
violates the Self-Incrimination Clause. Although this conclusion is
difficult for prosecutors to accept, it is supported by the history and
context of the adoption of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Furthermore, this understanding of the Fifth Amendment does not
preclude the government from unilaterally searching for and seizing
the document pursuant to proper Fourth Amendment procedure.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should reevaluate its
current understanding of the act of production doctrine. Specifically,
the Court should examine the growing body of scholarship, which
Justice Thomas alluded to in his concurrence in Hubbell, suggesting
that the current doctrine betrays the fundamental protections
provided by the Self-Incrimination Clause. In Part II, this Note
explores the Court's understanding of the doctrine from the era of
sacrosanct property rights to the modern rise of the government's
interest in investigating document-intensive white-collar crime. With
this background in mind, Part III outlines the privilege against selfincrimination as it was understood around the time of the drafting of
the the Constitution. Part IV introduces the problems the Hubbell
Court's decision raises with respect to this history. In particular, this
Note identifies a gap in the Court's modern understanding of the
doctrine, and in Part V, this Note provides guidance and
recommendations on the resolution of this lacuna in a way that is
historically faithful, yet still protects the government's interest in
effectively prosecuting white-collar crime. Ultimately, this Note
concludes that a reexamination of the current act of production
doctrine is essential to prevent government interference with the right
to be free from compelled self-incrimination.

II.BACKGROUND
The background of the act of production doctrine demonstrates
the way in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the privilege
against self-incrimination as it relates to documentary evidence in
white-collar criminal investigations. However, before examining this
line of cases, it is important to gain an initial understanding of how
prosecutors and grand juries gather this type of evidence.

FISHING FOR CLARITY
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A. Procedure
The grand jury's power to investigate potential criminal
wrongdoing derives from its ability to use the subpoena authority
traditionally given to the court that impaneled the jury. 26 Grand jury
subpoenas are either ad testificandum, compelling an individual to
appear before the grand jury and testify under oath, or subpoenas
duces tecum.27 The subpoena duces tecum allows the grand jury to
obtain tangible evidence, usually either physical evidence or
documents. 28 Within the realm of criminal procedure, the subpoena
duces tecum is quite similar to a search warrant. 29
However, as LaFave, Israel, and King note, the subpoena duces
tecum offers prosecutors several advantages over the search warrant
because it imposes a lower requirement on the government to justify
the compulsion exerted upon individuals to produce documents or
physical evidence. 30 First, the subpoena duces tecum can issue without
a showing of probable cause, while a search warrant clearly cannot.31
Second, a "party served may be required to undertake the extensive
task of bringing together records from different locations and sorting
through them to collect those covered by the subpoena."3 2 Third, where
the grand jury needs to obtain records from a third party, a subpoena
will be less disruptive to the third party's operations than a search
warranty3 Fourth, the government may decline to include the
justification for the selection of particular records and evidence in a
subpoena because, in contrast to a warrant, no such statement is
required. 34 Finally, any objection to the scope or issuance of the
subpoena must be raised "prior to the response, and the consequence
is the quashing of the subpoena. This allows the government to
refashion the subpoena to meet the sustained objections, and there is
no loss of evidence that could have been obtained through a curable
35
illegality."
These features of the subpoena duces tecum are important to
an understanding of the act of production doctrine as it relates to the

26. LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 11, § 8.3(a).
27. See id.
28. Id. §§ 8.3(a), 8.12(a).
29. See id. § 8.3(c).
30. Id.
31.

Id.

32.
33.

Id.
Id.

34.

Id.

35.

Id.
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privilege against self-incrimination. The subpoena provides a grand
jury with broad powers to explore and investigate potential criminal
wrongdoing. In so doing, it also has the potential to compel individuals
to implicate themselves in this wrongdoing. While the notion of lay
citizens wielding this power is laudable, it also raises the specter of
excessive government interference with an individual's freedom from
self-incrimination. The history of the Supreme Court's treatment of
the act of production doctrine underscores this concern.
B. Case Law-From Boyd to Doe II
The development of the doctrine has proceeded from a broad
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of the
doctrine's initial articulation to the current, more narrow
interpretation. In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court first
acknowledged a constitutional protection against self-incrimination in
36
the context of document production.
The factual circumstances in Boyd v. United States were fairly
ordinary. The United States initiated a seizure action against the
defendants for thirty-five boxes of plate glass allegedly smuggled into
the country through the port of New York. 37 In an effort to gather
evidence against the defendants, the government issued a subpoena
for the invoices for twenty-nine of the thirty-five boxes. 38 After the
defendants were convicted at trial, the Court reversed the conviction,
reasoning that "a compulsory production of the private books and
papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is
compelling [the defendant] to be a witness against himself, within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment . . . ,,39 The Court based its holding
in Boyd on a coextensive understanding of the privilege against selfincrimination and the Fourth Amendment right to security in one's
home and papers. 40 Boyd was decided in the Lochner era, when
property rights were inviolate and "a person's right to his property
include[d] the right not to have it introduced against him in a criminal
36. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886).
37. Id. at 617.
38. See id. at 618.
39. Id. at 634-35.
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633 ("[We have been unable to perceive
that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself."); see also Shauna J.
Sullivan, Note, Fifth Amendment Protection and the Productionof Corporate Documents, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 747, 751 (1987) ("The Boyd court viewed the compelled production of personal papers
as the equivalent of forcing testimony from an individual because the content of the papers was
private.").
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case." 4 1 Although the Court emphasized the primacy of protection for
personal papers and records over business records, the use of the
latter as evidence against the defendant was still considered a
violation of a defendant's "natural" property rights. 42
The privilege was understood in a similar fashion for eighty
years, until the middle of the twentieth century when the Court began
to narrow its scope. 43 One theory that explains the demise of Boyd,
and the rise of the modern act of production doctrine, is the decline of
the Lochner-era notion of the inviolability of property rights. 44 During
the Lochner era, the Court was far more willing to protect commonlaw property and liberty rights from the interference of the political

41. Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncriminationClause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 884 (1995); see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 803 (1989) ("In its own eyes, the Lochner Court was not regulating
economics; it was protecting liberty-the liberty of contract. That a man was free to do as he
pleased with his own property-that is property in which he had a 'vested right'-was axiomatic
in the thinking of many at that time. From this point of view, Lochner did not involve mere
'economics' but rather the most fundamental liberties of man against the state."); see also
Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion "To Be a Witness" and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1575, 1587 (1999) ("The Boyd Court's conception of privacy.., remained tied closely to
common law property rights.").
42. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-27. "The great end, for which men entered into society, was to
secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where
it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole." Id. at 627
(citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765)). In Entick, an editor
suspected of treasonous libel sued for trespass after the government entered his home to search
for incriminating documents. 19 Howell's State Trials at 1030. Lord Camden found that, under
the general warrant power, to search the "secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this
kingdom ... whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge" was oppressive to those
innocent of criminal wrongdoing. Id. at 1063. In finding for Entick, Lord Camden held that the
common law precluded such incriminating searches, reasoning that "the law obligeth no man to
accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the
innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust .. " Id. at 1072-73. Although this
case is often cited as the foundation for the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Boyd Court found that "the unreasonable searches and seizures condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence
against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment .
Boyd, 116
U.S. at 633.
43.
The object of the amendment is to establish in express language and upon a firm basis
the general principle of English and American jurisprudence, that no one shall be
compelled to give testimony which may expose him to prosecution for crime. It is not
declared that he may not be compelled to testify to facts which may impair his
reputation for probity, or even tend to disgrace him, but the line is drawn at testimony
that may expose him to prosecution.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66-67 (1906).
44. See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 41, at 885 ("As the twentieth century wore on, the
spirit of the Lochner era declined, and so did Boyd and its progeny.").
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branches of the government. 45 But with the decline of this mode of
analysis, and with the 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
the Court allowed some measure of interference with these commonlaw rights. 46 Another, somewhat related explanation is that the rise of
the modern regulatory state necessitated empowering the government
with the ability to gather evidence against the perpetrators of whitecollar crimes. 47 As Professor Stuntz notes, the government in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century did not need to conduct paper
searches to the extent they do today for the ordinary criminal
investigation. 48 The paper searches so valuable in the modern
regulatory state are "the key to solving white-collar crime ... not
street crime," with which law enforcement of an earlier era was far
more concerned. 49 In addressing the modern act of production cases,
the Court initially borrowed from Justice Holmes's view that "the
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material." 50 In 1966, Justice Brennan
used this logic when he wrote for the Court that bodily evidence could
be extracted from a defendant and used as evidence against him at
trial. 51 In Schmerber v. California,the Court established the rule that
evidence taken from a defendant, in that case blood taken from a
hospitalized defendant following a drunk driving accident, was not
testimonial in nature. 52 The Schmerber Court distinguished Boyd's

45. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 885 (1987) ("For
the most part, liberty and property are defined by reference to the common law. Interests
protected at common law-including most prominently the right to private property, the right to
bodily integrity and other rights protected in the Lochner era-are axiomatically entitled to
protection.").
46. 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937); see Sunstein, supra note 45, at 882.
47. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 402 ("[White-collar crime in the eighteenth century
had a very different cast than today. It included much less in the way of business crime, because
the mass of regulatory statutes that define such crimes today did not exist.").
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (emphasis added).
51. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). The Schmerber Court relied in
part on Holmes's decision in Holt, where the Court held that a prisoner could be compelled to
model a blouse that would potentially incriminate him in the crime. Id. at 763 (citing Holt, 218
U.S. at 252-53). Holmes reasoned that "the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to
be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." Id.
(quoting Holt, 218 U.S. at 252-53).
52. See id. at 761; see also Amar & Lettow, supra note 41, at 861 (noting the incongruity of
admitting "reliable physical evidence" such as blood because it is not testimonial, while excluding
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precepts on the ground that "the privilege is a bar against compelling
'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a
suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not
violate it." 53 After Schmerber, the government was able to obtain
physical evidence from the defendant that incriminated him in
criminal wrongdoing.
The current understanding of the act of production doctrine
54
began in 1973 with the Court's decision in Couch v. United States.
However, two 1976 cases and their progeny effectively "put to rest the
proposition that the Fifth Amendment generally protects persons
against compelled production of preexisting materials that are
incriminatory in content. '55 Fisher v. United States was a tax case in
which the petitioner's attorney was called upon to produce documents
delivered by the attorney's clients following the preliminary stages of
"reliable physical fruit" such as a bloody knife or a dead body because it is "witnessing" against
oneself).
53. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
54. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). The facts in Couch mirror the facts in many of the later cases and
are the most applicable to modern white-collar prosecutions. Ms. Couch was the "sole
proprietress" of a restaurant and had for fourteen years given her tax records to her accountant
for the purpose of preparing income tax returns. Id. at 324. In connection with an IRS
investigation into possible income tax fraud and the resulting summons, Ms. Couch's accountant
turned over the documents to her attorney. Id. at 325. When the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia to enforce the
summons, Ms. Couch intervened, asserting that her ownership of the records in question
warranted a Fifth Amendment privilege barring their production. Id. The Court found that "the
ingredient of personal compulsion" against Ms. Couch was missing because the summons and
the district court order enforcing it were directed against Ms. Couch's accountant. Id. at 329.
Emphasizing the suspect's expectation of privacy, the Court rejected Couch's Fifth Amendment
claim because there was "no semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the
accused." Id. at 336.
55. Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1590; see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976);
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The petitioner in Andresen was an attorney in solo
practice whose real estate settlement activities came under the scrutiny of two Maryland State's
Attorneys' offices investigating fraud in the Washington, D.C. area. See Andresen, 427 U.S. at
465. A warrant was issued for the seizure of documents related to the sale and conveyance of the
lot in question from the petitioner's law office. Id. at 466. At trial, the petitioner objected to the
admission into evidence of some of the seized documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment
grounds. Id. at 467. The trial court returned forty-five of the fifty-two items seized in the search
to the petitioner, but found that the seizure of the remaining items did not violate the
petitioner's Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. Id. Petitioner was convicted of five counts of
"false pretenses" and three counts of fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary. Id. at 469. The
Court affirmed the conviction on the grounds that the petitioner was "not asked to say or do
anything." Id. at 473, 484. Although the Court conceded that the records seized were
incriminating and that some of those records contained statements made by the petitioner, it
found that "there is no chance in this case of petitioner's statements being self-deprecatory and
untrustworthy because they were extracted from him-they were already in existence and had
been made voluntarily." Id. at 471, 477. The Court relied on Fisher in deciding that the
petitioner's statements were not self-incriminatory because they were "voluntarily committed to
paper before the police arrived to search for them." Id. at 477.

624

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:613

an IRS investigation into possible civil or criminal liability. 56 The
Court framed the Fifth Amendment question in the context of the
petitioner's attorney-client privilege. 57 If the document in question had
been privileged in the hands of the petitioners, that privilege also
would have applied to the lawyer by virtue of the attorney-client
privilege. 58 Relying on its decision in Couch, the Court found that the
compelled production of the documents did not violate the Fifth
Amendment, because the subpoena did not operate against the
accused. 59 Justice White wrote for the Court that "[i]t is extortion of
information from the accused himself that offends our sense of
justice" 60 and concluded that "[t]he taxpayer is the 'accused,' and
nothing is being extorted from him." 61 Although the summonses were
directed to the attorneys, the Court nevertheless addressed the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment privilege to the taxpayers
themselves. 62 The Court separated the union that Boyd created
between the Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections, reasoning that
to interpret the Fifth Amendment as providing privacy protection for
the contents of a man's "mouth or pen" would be to read that
constitutional provision as repetitive of the Fourth Amendment's
63
property-based privacy protection.
Moreover, Fisher provided authoritative guidance on the
substantive governmental right to use the subpoena power. The Court
established that the act of producing evidence in response to a
subpoena could have communicative aspects of its own wholly aside
from the contents of the papers produced since, at a minimum, the act
of production doctrine acknowledges the existence of the requested
documents. 64 Though Justice White conceded this testimonial aspect of
compliance with a grand jury subpoena, he reasoned that the Fifth
Amendment's protections would not be implicated as long as the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Fisher,425 U.S. at 393-95.
Id. at 396.
See id.
See id. at 397-99.
Id. at 398 (quoting Couch, 409 U.S. at 328).
Id.
See id. at 396-97; see also Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1593.

63.

Fisher, 425 U.S. at 400.

64. See id. at 410. Moreover, Professor Nagareda notes that "as a practical matter, a person
cannot produce a document that does not exist or one over which the person has no control. For
this reason, admissions of existence and control are implicit in every act of production."
Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1595.
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defendant voluntarily prepared the documents in question. 65 Fisher
removed most of the constraints on the subpoena power by holding
that "the privilege against self-incrimination protects only the act of
producing subpoenaed evidence and not the evidence itself."66 Finally,
the Court noted that where "[t]he existence and location of the papers
are a foregone conclusion and the [defendant] adds little or nothing to
the sum total of the government's information by conceding that he in
fact has the papers," the defendant has not been compelled to
incriminate himself.67 Implicit in the Court's line of reasoning is that
admissions of the existence and possession of documents or records do
not trigger the Fifth Amendment protection against selfincrimination, because the evidence offered satisfies the foregone
conclusion test.6 8 When the government has sufficient preexisting
knowledge about the documents or records summoned, apart from
existence and possession, the question becomes one "not of testimony
but of surrender." 69 With this opinion, the Court laid the foundation
for its emphasis upon the breadth of the subpoena as the crucial
variable in determining whether compliance with such a subpoena
violated the privilege against self-incrimination.
Over the course of the next twenty-five years, the Court
routinely applied Fisher to white-collar act of production cases. 70 By
65. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11 ("[H]owever incriminating the accountant's workpapers
might be, the act of producing them-the only thing which the taxpayer is compelled to dowould not itself involve testimonial self-incrimination.").
66. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 444. Stuntz noted the Fisherdecision's irony in terms of privacy
protection. He explained that "[s]ubpoenas can and do require disclosure of material that is much
more private than the sorts of things police officers find in car searches, yet the subpoenas are
much less heavily regulated than the searches." Id.
67. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
68. Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously,
73 VA. L. REV. 1, 29 (1987) ("In Fisher, the Supreme Court suggested that implicit admissions
concerning the existence and possession of documents did not rise to the level of testimony
protected by the Fifth Amendment where the substance of the admissions could be characterized
as foregone conclusions."). As Professor Mosteller notes, in Fisher the Court outlined two other
justifications for the foregone conclusion doctrine: first, "the government is in no way relying on
the 'truthtelling' of the [witness] to prove" existence and possession, and second, "the existence
and possession are not substantially at issue in the case." Id. at 30 (citing Fisher,425 U.S. at
411-12).
69. Fisher,425 U.S. at 411 (quoting In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911)).
70. For example, in United States v. Doe ("Doe 1"), the Court held that when the preparation
of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is present and the contents of the subpoenaed
documents in question are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment. 465 U.S. 605, 610-12
(1984). Doe I presented the question of whether the privilege against self-incrimination applied
to the business records of a sole proprietorship. Id. at 606. The respondent in Doe I received five
subpoenas of varying scope from a grand jury investigating corruption in the awarding of county
and municipal contracts. Id. The Supreme Court found that the respondent had voluntarily
prepared the documents in question, and that the subpoena would not force him to "restate,
repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents." Id. at 611-12. In differentiating between the
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the time of the Hubbell decision, the act of production doctrine had
evolved quite far from where it had begun in Boyd more than a
century earlier.
C. United States v. Hubbell
Although Webster Hubbell's case presented the Court with a
familiar act of production scenario, the players and circumstances
were anything but typical. The case was a by-product of Whitewater
Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr's investigation into possible
criminal activity by President and Mrs. Clinton and their associates,
71
and Mr. Hubbell was one of its targets.
1. Procedural Posture
A provision in the Ethics in Government Act empowered
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr to ask the Special Division of the
D.C. Circuit ("Special Division") to refer to him matters related to the
independent counsel's prosecutorial discretion. 72 As a result of such a
request, Starr began his investigation into Hubbell's billing and
expense practices while a member of the Rose law firm in Little Rock,
Arkansas. 73 Hubbell pleaded guilty to two felony counts and, pursuant
to the plea agreement, agreed to cooperate with Starr's investigation
contents of the documents and the act of producing those documents, the Court relied on its
holding in Fisher, reasoning that a defendant cannot avoid compliance with a subpoena by
asserting that the contents of the documents requested contain incriminating evidence. Id. at
611. If the documents were voluntarily prepared, the contents of those documents are not
privileged for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause. Id. at 612; see also id. at 618 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of
private papers of any kind."). However, the Court in Doe I fleshed out Fisher as that decision
related to the act of responding to a subpoena duces tecum. See Doe I, 465 U.S. at 612-13 (citing
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410); see also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957) ("The
custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a subpoena duces tecum is itself a
representation that the documents produced are those demanded by the subpoena."). If
compliance with the subpoena tacitly admits certain facts about the documents' existence,
possession, and whereabouts, then responding to the subpoena may be testimonial, and thus the
government is prohibited from compelling such an admission if it tends to incriminate the
defendant in criminal wrongdoing. See Doe I, 465 U.S. at 617. In Doe v. United States ("Doe IF'),
the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that "every written and oral statement significant
for its content is necessarily testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment." 487 U.S. 201, 208
(1988). In rejecting Doe's claim that this was compulsory self-incrimination, the Court held that
"[i]t is consistent with the history of and the policies underlying the self-incrimination clause to
hold that the privilege may be asserted only to resist compelled explicit or implicit disclosures of
incriminating information." Id. at 212.
71. United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 27 (D.D.C. 1998).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 594(e)(2000); see United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 554-55 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
73. See id. at 555.
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by providing full, complete, accurate, and truthful information about
74
Whitewater and related transactions.
In 1996, while Hubbell was serving his jail sentence as part of
his plea agreement, the Independent Counsel discovered that Hubbell
had been receiving consulting fees since 1994. 75 Starr sought and
obtained another referral from the Special Division under § 594(e) to
investigate (1) whether Hubbell had violated any criminal tax or mail
and wire fraud statutes, and (2) whether he had committed any crimes
including, but not limited to, obstruction of justice, perjury, false
76
statements, and mail and wire fraud related to the consulting fees.
Specifically, Starr sought "to determine whether a relationship existed
between [the consulting fees] and Mr. Hubbell's testimony with
respect to Whitewater and Madison-related matters."77 Starr obtained
what the D.C. Circuit described as a broad-reaching subpoena duces
tecum from the grand jury investigating the possibility of Hubbell's
criminal wrongdoing. In response, Hubbell invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege.7 8 Hubbell delivered over 13,000 pages of
documents specified in the subpoena only after the Independent
Counsel granted him use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002,
79
6003.
74. See id. These transactions included President and Mrs. Clinton's relationships with
Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association, Whitewater Development Corporation, and
Capital Management Services, Inc. Id. at 554-55. The story of this investigation and its results is
beyond the scope of this Note.
75. See id. at 555. According to the second indictment, the consulting fees included $100,000
from Hong Kong China Limited, an entity controlled by the Riady Family through the Lippo
Group, and $62,775 from the Revlon Corporation. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 555-56.
78. See id. at 563. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit used the breadth of the government's knowledge
as a key factor to determine if an individual has been compelled to incriminate himself: "We
conclude that the testimonial value varies directly with the quantum of information that the
government seeks to extract through compelling the expression of the contents of an individual's
mind and inversely with the quantum of information in the government's possession at the time
of the relevant subpoena issues." Id. at 575.
79. These provisions, relating to use immunity, provide:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to... a court or
grand jury of the United States... and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued under this title, the witness may not
refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination;
but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case ....
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2000).
In the case of an individual who has been or may be called to testify ... the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held
shall issue ...an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other
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Unfortunately for Hubbell, the contents of the production led to
the Independent Counsel's second prosecution. In April of 1998, a
grand jury in the District of Columbia returned a ten-count indictment
0
charging Hubbell with tax-related crimes and mail and wire fraud.8
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the
indictment as a violation of § 6002, because the government had
obtained the evidence against Hubbell either directly or indirectly
from the "testimonial aspects of [Hubbell's] immunized act of
producing [the] documents" and referred to Hubbell's case as "the
quintessential fishing expedition."8 1 The district court emphasized
that the Independent Counsel freely admitted that the breadth of the
subpoena allowed him to build the case against Hubbell based upon
information subpoenaed for a case that was different "in all material
82
respects."
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit also focused on the breadth of the
subpoena. The D.C. Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and
remanded with instructions to the Independent Counsel to
demonstrate with "reasonable particularity a prior awareness that the
exhaustive litany of documents sought in the subpoena existed and
were in Hubbell's possession .... To the extent that the information
conveyed through Hubbell's compelled act of production provides the
necessary linkage, however, the indictment deriving therefrom is
tainted."8 3 Judge Wald, in a dissent, argued that "as long as the
prosecutor could make use of information contained in the documents
or derived therefrom without any reference to the fact that respondent
had produced them in response to a subpoena, there would be no
improper use of the testimonial aspect of the immunized act of
production."8 4 According to Judge Wald, Hubbell's Fifth Amendment
privilege and statutory use immunity would only protect him from the
information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this
title.
§ 6003. See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 563. For an explanation of the constitutional foundation of
statutory use immunity, see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-45 (1972). Though a
detailed analysis of Hubbell's grant of immunity is a significant aspect of Hubbell's case, it is
beyond the scope of this Note. In short, use immunity prevents the government from using
documents produced pursuant to a grant of immunity, and the Court has held that the scope and
protection of use immunity is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000); see also Kastigar,406 U.S. at
458-59.
80. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 31.
81. Id. at 32; see also United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33-37 (D.D.C. 1998).
82. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
83. Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 581.
84. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 33 (citing Hubbell, 166 F.3d at 602 (Wald, J., dissenting)).
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prosecutor's use of information obtained by the subpoena that was
beyond what the prosecutor would have known if the documents and
85
records appeared unsolicited in his office, "like manna from heaven."
On remand, Starr acknowledged that he could not satisfy the
D.C. Circuit's reasonable particularity standard and entered into a
conditional plea agreement with Hubbell.8 6 The agreement provided
for the dismissal of the charges unless the Court's disposition of the
case made it "reasonably likely that Hubbell's act of production
87
immunity would not pose a significant bar to his prosecution.
According to the agreement, if this condition were not met, a guilty
plea would be entered and Mr. Hubbell would receive a sentence free
of the possibility of jail time.88 The Court granted certiorari to
determine "the precise scope of a grant of immunity with respect to
the production of documents in response to a subpoena" and affirmed
89
the D.C. Circuit's decision.
2. The Majority Opinion
At the outset, the majority relied on Justice Holmes's reasoning
in Holt v. United States90 to explain that, within the text of the Fifth
Amendment, the protection granted to a "witness" is limited to the
protection against compelled incriminatory communications that are
testimonial in nature. 91 The Court distinguished between compulsion
to extort communications from a defendant and compulsion to engage
in conduct that may be incriminating. 92 It implied that while the
former is impermissible, the latter might be permissible. 93 The Court
recounted the history of the act of production cases, discussed above,
and with an emphasis on Fisher, applied the law of those cases to the
94
facts of Hubbell's case.
85. Id. (quoting Hubbell, 166 F.3d at 602 (Wald, J., dissenting)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 33-34.
88. See id. at 34.
89. Id.
90. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
91. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 34.
92. Id. at 34-35 (citing Holt, 218 U.S. at 252-53).
93. See id. at 34 n.9 (" '[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.' "
(quoting Holt, 218 U.S. at 252-53)); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 594-98 (1990)
(drawing the same distinctions as the "post-Schmerber cases" between testimonial and
nontestimonial oral or written communications).
94. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 35-41. Specifically, the Court emphasized two important,
though conflicting, points. First, the Court pointed out that "a person may be required to produce
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Justice Stevens wrote that the government had already made
derivative use of the testimonial aspect of Hubbell's act of producing
the documents requested by the subpoena, thereby violating his use
immunity. 95 The majority opinion continued to emphasize the breadth
of the subpoena. In finding that use immunity runs coextensively with
the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court held that the
Independent Counsel had not shown that he had any "prior knowledge
of either the existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of
documents ultimately produced by [Hubbell]."96 Thus, Hubbell's act of
producing these documents was testimonial in nature, and when the
Independent Counsel used these documents as part of the 1998
indictment, he violated Hubbell's use immunity. Furthermore as the
"statutory guarantee of use and derivative-use immunity is as broad
as the constitutional privilege" against self-incrimination, any
violation of Hubbell's immunity was also a violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights. 97 Accordingly, the Court ordered the indictment
against Hubbell dismissed and affirmed the D.C. Circuit's judgment. 98
3. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Hubbell is not a major
departure from settled act of production doctrine. 99 Justice Thomas's
concurring opinion, on the other hand, is a novel and profound
reexamination of the scope and meaning of the Self-Incrimination
Clause. Justice Thomas emphasized the fact that "[n]one of [the]
Court's cases ... has undertaken an analysis of the meaning of [the
term 'witness'] at the time of the founding." 10 0 The opinion began by
noting the substantial support for the proposition that, at the time of
the Founding, "witness" meant a person "who gives or furnishes
evidence." 10 1 This meaning is obviously broader than the Court's
understanding of the term in the context of modern act of production

specific documents even though they contain incriminating assertions of fact or belief because
the creation of those documents was not compelled within the meaning of the privilege." Id. at
35-36. Second, the Court "made it clear that the act of producing documents in response to a
subpoena may have a compelled testimonial aspect ...the act of production itself may implicitly
communicate statements of fact." Id. at 36.
95. See id. at 41; see also supra note 79.
96. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41, 45.
97. See id. at 46. For a description of use immunity, see supra note 79.
98. Id.
99. But see Uviller, supra note 10, at 333 ("This reading of the Hubbell message, which is
hopefully erroneous, implies a substantial doctrinal shift.").
100. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. Id.
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doctrine. 10 2 Justice Thomas then explained that the privilege against
self-incrimination was adopted in the Virginia Declaration of Rights in
1776,103 reflecting the general common-law protection for compelled
production of incriminating physical evidence, including papers and
documents, suggested by the definition of "witness." 10 4 The opinion
noted that seven other states followed Virginia's lead in adopting
provisions whereby citizens were granted the privilege to be free from
10 5
compulsion to give evidence or to furnish evidence.
Justice Thomas next described the history surrounding James
Madison's authorship of the Fifth Amendment in response to the
demands from the states for a federal bill of rights. 10 6 Justice Thomas
noted that Madison replaced the phrases "to give evidence" or "to
furnish evidence" with the phrase "to be a witness" in the Fifth
Amendment.107 This substitution attracted no attention in Congress or
in the state legislatures responsible for ratifying the Bill of Rights,
thereby implying that the states, and everyone else, understood the
108
alternative phrasings to be synonymous.
102. Id. Justice Thomas began his opinion with a survey of the definition of "witness" in the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century dictionaries, as well as in prominent English cases that
arose before the founding of the United States. See id. at 50, 51 n.2; see also Nagareda, supra
note 41, at 1608-09 ("Contemporaneous essays in the popular press similarly attest to the
importance of recognizing a right not to be compelled 'to furnish evidence' against oneself ....
")
(citing The Federal Farmer No. 6 (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in NEIL H. COGAN ET AL., THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS § 9.1.2.1, at 333 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997); Brutus No. 2 (Nov. 1,
1787), reprinted in COGAN ET AL., supra, § 9.2.4.1, at 333).
103. The Virginia Declaration of Rights provided
[t]hat in all capital prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature
of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence
in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whole
unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, nor can he be compelled to give evidence
against himself; that no man be deprived of his liberty except by the law of the land,
or the judgment of his peers.
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS ch. I, § VIII (emphasis added).
104. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Eben Moglen, The Privilege
in British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, in THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 133-34 (R. Helmholz et al. eds.,
1997)).
105. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 52 (Thomas J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing relevant
clauses from each state's constitution).
106. Id. at 53.
107. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
108. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 53 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
290-91 (2d ed. 1999)). Professor Nagareda points out:
One striking feature of the historical record is that it contains no evidence of
opposition to Madison's unique phrasing--certainly, no evidence to suggest that state
leaders somehow thought that Madison had bamboozled them by altering the
substance of their proposals through linguistic sleight-of-hand. If contemporary
observers had understood Madison's handiwork to make a substantive change to the
proposals uniformly put forward by the state ratifying conventions, one would expect
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The opinion concluded by reasoning that the breadth of the
definition of "witness" in other clauses of the Constitution supports
the proposition that the term encompasses one who gives evidence. 109
For example, in 1807, Chief Justice Marshall held that the
Compulsory Process Clause 1 0 grants an accused the right to secure
papers, not just testimony, material to his defense. 1 1 ' Thus, to be a
witness under the Compulsory Process Clause includes the
presentation of documents in one's defense-an
analogous
interpretation of the term Madison contemplated in the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause.' 12 Although neither the
Hubbell majority opinion nor Justice Thomas's concurrence departed
from the act of production doctrine established in Fisher, Justice
Thomas indicated his willingness to reconsider the propriety of that
doctrine in light of historical considerations. 113
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
AROUND THE TIME OF THE FRAMING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
To illustrate the apparent incongruity between the Hubbell
Court's majority interpretation of the act of production doctrine and
the understanding of the privilege around the time of the Founding,
some historical background is required.

to find at least a peep of objection. There was none, notwithstanding the substantial
overlap between the leaders of the state ratifying conventions and the membership of
the First Congress that approved the Bill of Rights.
Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1607-08.
Indeed, Justice Thomas noted that "the only Member of the First Congress to address selfincrimination during the debates on the Bill of Rights treated the phrases as synonymous,
restating Madison's formation as a ban on forcing one to give evidence against himself." Hubbell,
530 U.S. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotes omitted) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS
753-54 (J. Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Laurance)).
109. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 54 (Thomas, J., concurring).
110. "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
111. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 54 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d C.C.D. Va.) (1807)).
112. See id. at 54-56 (analyzing cases such as United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711
(1974), to support the proposition that the definition of "witness" includes the presentation of
documents and records and not just oral testimony). But see KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX:
THE CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 275 (1997) (explaining President Nixon's understanding of the
word "testimony" as meaning oral testimony only, not documents).
113. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56.
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A. The PreconstitutionalColonialPrivilege
The American notion of the privilege against selfincrimination, though firmly rooted in our libertarian past, is not as
clear-cut as some commentators have posited. 114 In the colonies, "[t]he
right against self-incrimination evolved ... as part of the reception of
the common law's accusatorial system of criminal procedure."'115 At the
same time, a right to remain silent during the course of a trial in
colonial America would have been "little more than a right not to
defend oneself at all" since at the time there was nominal
representation for a criminal defendant at trial. 116 Still, at least in
principle, the citizens of the American colonies enjoyed freedoms
similar to their English counterparts. 11 7 Many colonial charters and
constitutions expressly guaranteed to the colonists the rights of
Englishmen.1' 8 Although these provisions were initially general,
providing Americans with equivalent privileges and liberties, the new
colonies soon began to provide specifically for their citizens' rights. 11 9
For example, the first law passed by the first New York General
Assembly in 1683 was the "Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges [sic],"
and it provided, inter alia, the right to a grand jury. 20 It was widely
accepted among New York lawyers in the middle of the eighteenth
114. Compare Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1099-1100 (1994) ("[S]ocioeconomic
forces militated in favor of expansion of summary jurisdiction, or its equivalent, in British North
America during the eighteenth century. In this crucial sense, self-incrimination became more,
rather than less, important to the administration of colonial criminal justice in the decades
preceding independence."), with LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 368-432
(1968) (tracing a clean linear path from the origins of the privilege to its adoption into colonial
common law).
115. LEVY, supra note 114, at 333.
116. See John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalizationof American SelfIncriminationDoctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 828 (1999) (noting that the absence of
representation at trial meant that if a defendant declined to speak in his own defense, he was in
effect declining to provide a defense).
117. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 26 (1977) ("When Englishmen migrated, they took with them, as it
was later put in Parliamentary debate, all of the first great privileges of Englishmen on their
backs." (internal citations omitted)).
118. See id. at 27 (citing the 1620 Charter of New England, the 1629 Charter of
Massachusetts Bay, the 1632 Charter of Maryland, the 1662 Charter of Connecticut, the 1663
Charters of Rhode Island and Carolina, the 1732 Charter of Georgia, and the 1765 Charter of
Virginia).
119. See id. at 33.
120. See id. at 44. The jury in general, and the grand jury in particular, began as a check on
the government's centralized power, but soon emerged as a body that "enjoyed a roving
commission to ferret out official malfeasance or self-dealing of any sort and bring it to the
attention of the public at large." AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 85 (1998).
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century that the maxim of English common law, nemo tenetur
accusare seipsum-"no man is bound to accuse himself'-was equally
applicable in the American common law. 12 1 A brief examination of the
colonial common law shows that American judges applied the
protection inherent in these provisions to incriminating documentary
evidence.
Although the records of colonial American trials are scant at
best, Levy recounts a 1702 New York treason trial involving
documentary evidence and the government's attempts to compel the
production of that evidence. 122 The trial of Nicholas Bayard and John
Hutchins arose from some critical comments that Bayard made
accusing the New York Lieutenant-Governor, the New York Chief
Justice, and members of the governing council of "nefarious actions
ranging from bribery to oppression."'123 Bayard drafted a number of
addresses containing these accusations, and in response, the
Lieutenant Governor ordered him to be investigated and charged with
an obscure form of treason, for which the sentence was capital
punishment. 124 During the preliminary investigation phase of the
case, the Lieutenant Governor employed inquisitorial tactics to gather
evidence about the addresses from the defendants' acquaintances, but
several of them refused to produce copies. 125 Bayard and Hutchins
were arrested shortly thereafter, the former being held in London,
while the latter was held in New York.' 26 According to Bayard's
complaints in London, Hutchins was being held without bail until he
produced the documents the government demanded. 127 The defendants
were convicted at trial, prompting Bayard and some associates in
London to complain that Hutchins had been compelled to incriminate
121. See LEVY, supra note 114, at 369-70. Levy argues that the privilege did not become
firmly rooted until the "rise of a substantial propertied class and the growing complexity and
prosperity of colonial business required the services of a trained legal profession." Id. at 368. As
the profession grew, so did the need for law books, in which the American lawyers discovered
that in England, the privilege had developed to the point discussed in this section. Id. at 370-73.
122. Id. at 379-80.
123. Id. at 379.
124. See id. Bayard delivered these addresses while in a sort of exile in London, where he
had gone after making some remarks critical of Governor Benjamin Fletcher's policies toward
New York merchants. Incidentally, at the same time, a number of those merchants stood accused
of having "farmed the excise"-a colonial form of tax evasion-and invoked a version of the
privilege against self-incrimination when called upon to "discover upon oath what profits they
had made by [their] farme." Counsel for the merchants denounced the oath as an infringement of
English liberties. Id. at 378.
125. See id. at 379. The government argued that the production of copies of the addresses
could be compelled because it sought to prosecute only the authors of the addresses and not those
suspects examined in the hopes of betraying the defendants. See id.
126. See id. at 379-80.
127. See id. at 379.
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himself in a criminal matter. 128 The Attorney-General of England
found that the colonial government in New York had compelled
Hutchins to produce a self-incriminating document and that his
129
refusal to do so formed the basis of the charge against him.
Subsequently, the Privy Council in London overturned the convictions
and ordered the sentences annulled.130 Although the colonial
government had not scrupulously honored the privilege, the highest
government officials recognized its legitimacy and "vied with each
'
other in denying that they had abridged it. 131
The historical record also contains cases involving
incriminating documents and records. By the middle of the eighteenth
century, in England and in the colonies, the privilege began to include
"protection against the necessity of producing books and documents
that might tend to incriminate the accused."1 3 2 In the English common
law, to compel a defendant to turn over corporate records would be to
force him to "furnish evidence against himself' in violation of the
privilege against self-accusation. 133 Lord Mansfield wrote that a
criminal defendant could not be compelled to produce any
incriminating documentary evidence, even if the government knows
that the defendant possesses the material in question. 134 Moreover, in
35
the wake of Lord Camden's decision in Entick v. Carrington,1
Americans brought the argument against the seizure of documents
and records to bear upon the writ of assistance, a device "used by
128. See id. at 380.
129. See id. Furthermore, at the same time that the Americans were developing the doctrine
of the privilege as it relates to documentary evidence, the English courts were grappling with the
same issues. See E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34
(1949). Morgan points to two cases, King v. Purnell, 96 ENG. REP. 20, 23 (Y.B. 1748), and Roe v.
Harvey, 98 ENG. REP. 302, 305 (Y.B. 1769), for the proposition that "the privilege applie[d] to all
documents in the possession of the person whom their contents will criminate." Id. However,
Morgan further notes that this proposition was qualified by the American cases dealing with
compelled production of documentary evidence. Id.
130. See LEVY, supra note 114, at 380.
131. Id. In a 1735 Pennsylvania heresy case, Benjamin Franklin wrote a pamphlet defending
a Presbyterian minister accused of having "deistic notions," which stated that "[i]t was contrary
to the common rights of mankind, no man being obligated to furnish matter of accusation against
himself," but he did not distinguish between oral and written material. See id. at 383.
132. Id. at 390. For example, in a 1744 case, the court refused the prosecution's request that
"the defendant be required to turn over the records of his corporation ....
Id.; see also Rex v.
Cornelius, 93 ENG. REP. 1133, 1134 (K.B. 1744).
133. See LEVY, supra note 114, at 390.
134. See id. Around this same time, the English courts began to wrestle with the question of
whether the evidence could be seized by a search warrant and introduced against the accused at
trial. At the outset, the right to silence was extended to prevent the use of general warrants to
seize private papers in seditious libel cases. See id.
135. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Entick, see supra note 42 and accompanying
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customs officials to search for contraband" or goods that had been
smuggled into a colonial port in violation of statutes regulating
colonial trade. 136 Based on a natural rights theory of property, the
Anglo-American common law recognized protections against a person
137
being compelled to produce incriminating documents and records.
B. Elevation to ConstitutionalStatus
By the time of the American Revolution and the ratification of
the Constitution, the seeds of the fundamental rights that were to be
embodied in the Bill of Rights had been planted in many of the
American colonies. 138 Moreover, in a majority of the colonial
constitutions predating the Bill of Rights, the privilege against selfincrimination was couched in terms of a provision that, in a criminal
case, the accused should not be compelled to give evidence against
himself. 139 With these provisions in effect, James Madison replaced
the phrases "to give evidence" or "to furnish evidence" in the state
constitutions with "to be a witness" when he drafted the Fifth
Amendment.1 40 Indeed, after initially opposing the idea, Madison
finally agreed to a federal bill of rights in response to declining
1 41
support from the states for ratification of the federal Constitution.
The logical implication here is that the silence from these state
representatives-who at times had been quite obstreperous-following
136. See LEVY, supra note 114, at 395. Levy points to the disparity in the procedures
employed by the common-law courts, where the privilege was more firmly established, and the
admiralty courts hearing customs cases. Id. These admiralty courts, armed with the testimony of
informers who received one-third of the value of the ship and cargo in the event of a conviction,
often prosecuted cases on the basis of an information or accusation alone, rather than a grand
jury subpoena. Id. Colonial merchants argued that these courts were inquisitorial in nature and
that they violated English common-law principles. Id. In England, commercial cases were tried
in the Court of Exchequer, which provided the same protections as ordinary common-law courts.
Id.
137. For a discussion of some of the more prominent of these cases, see infra note 213 and
accompanying text.
138. See id.
139. See Morgan, supra note 129, at 23 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 109
(1908)). Morgan notes that the jurisdictional scope of the courts applying the privilege varied,
but that by the time of the constitutional ratification, the privilege was well established in
various forms. Id. For example, "[iun six of the Colonial Constitutions preceding 1789 the
provision forbade compelling a person to give evidence against himself in criminal prosecutions,"
but "in Maryland the prohibition applied in a common court of law or in any other court." Id.;
accord R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and ConstitutionalHistory of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 764-65 (1934) ("[T]his privilege had been inserted
in the constitutions or Bills of Rights of seven American States before 1789.").
140. See Nagareda, supranote 41 at 1604-05.
141. See ROBERT J. MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 132-36 (1988).
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this change supports a collateral understanding of the differing
versions of the text. 142 As Professor Morgan notes, "Upon separation
from Britain, Americans became free to shape their laws in ways
consistent with their new form of government."1 43 The fact that the
states ratified Madison's version without objection suggests a broader
protection than that currently provided. Although the privilege
against self-incrimination, as part of the Bill of Rights, served as a
buffer against the concentration of power within the legislative and
executive branches, 44 the constitutional protection adopted in 1789
was not as broad as English precedent might have warranted.' 45 Many
of the pre-1789 colonial constitutions prohibited compelled selfincrimination "in a common law court or in any other court," while the
federal provision only mentioned criminal prosecutions. 14 6 However,
even if the privilege was limited to criminal cases, the fact remained
that in these criminal cases, the use of the phrase "witness" replaced
the preexisting language without resistance from the ratifying
states.' 47 As Professor Richard Nagareda observes, the reasons for
Madison's substitution are lost to history, but the fact that no member
of the First Congress objected to the substitution remains. 148 In fact,
the one member of Congress who did address the issue of selfincrimination mentioned it in terms of the version from the
149
contemporaneous state constitutions.
To support his proposition that the substitution meant that
Madison understood the definition of a witness to include the giving of

142. Id. at 176. "At the Constitutional Convention, Madison said that he would 'always
exclude inconsistent principles in framing a system of government.' " Id.
143. Id. at 175.
144. See id. at 138. Those arguing against passage of a federal bill of rights pointed to the
absence of an equivalent protection in the British constitutional system. Id. Madison cleverly
used this argument against those making it, because as Morgan notes, "[t]he two systems are not
comparable ... because the British have raised barriers against the crown" with the Magna
Carta, "but they have left the powers of Parliament indefinite." Id.
145. See Morgan, supra note 129, at 23.
146. Id. The Court has since clarified the scope of the protection in superficially noncriminal
settings. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ("The privilege afforded not only
extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal
statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.").
147. See, e.g., Pittman, supra note 139, at 788 ("In all of the debates on the Federal
Constitution in the adopting conventions, there were but few allusions to this privilege, and,
when mentioned, it was mentioned as a privilege against torture."); see also supra notes 141-42.
148. See Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1607-08.
149. See id. at 1608; see also LEVY, supra note 114, at 424. The speaker, a Federalist lawyer
from New York, addressed the proposal prohibiting compelled self-incrimination in terms of the
language from section VIII of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which in turn spoke of a
prohibition against a witness's being compelled to give evidence against himself. Id.
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evidence, Nagareda identifies three distinct lines of historical
authority. 150 First, he points to contemporaneous sources of language
reflected in the Oxford English dictionary, which defines "witness" as
"one who gives evidence in relation to matters under inquiry."151
Second, Nagareda examines the meaning of "witness" within the
Compulsory
Process
Clause,
utilizing
what
Amar
calls
"intratextualism" to support the notion that the Founders intended for
the term to have the same meaning in adjoining amendments in the
Bill of Rights. 152 Finally, the meaning of the term in contemporaneous
common law lends credence to the notion that the Framers understood
the definitions of the two terms to be synonymous. 153 However, with
the onset of the twentieth century and the decline of the Lochner
era, 54 the privilege no longer provided a categorical protection against
155
the compelled production of incriminating books or papers.
IV. THE PROBLEMS HUBBELL RAISES

The two main opinions in Hubbell raise the possibility that a
fissure may be forming in the Court's understanding of the act of
production doctrine. In the future, the Court may have an opportunity
to use a case involving a narrowly tailored subpoena to reevaluate its
current understanding of the doctrine as it relates to documentary

150. See Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1608-23.
151. See id. at 1608-09.
152. See id. at 1609-10 (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748
(1999)). But see Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble
with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 759 (2000).
Amar pays no attention at all to the institutional capacities of the judges who would
be charged with practicing intratextualism.... Interpreters cannot choose among
possible interpretive rules solely on the basis of some first-best theory of
constitutional meaning. Rather, interpretive doctrine must combine a theory of
constitutional obligation with an assessment of the capacities and competence of the
interpreters who will apply the doctrine.
153. See Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1615-23. Nagareda identifies several cases for the
proposition that the Anglo-American common law had adopted the definition of a witness as one
who gives evidence. Id.
154. See Rubenfeld, supra note 41, at 803; see also John Lawrence Hill, A Third Theory of
Liberty: The Evolution of Our Conception of Freedom in American Constitutional Thought, 29
HAST. CONST. L.Q. 115, 122 (2002) ("It was during the Lochner era, which roughly spanned the
years 1897 to 1937, that libertarian theory reached its zenith in constitutional law.").
155. See Morgan, supra note 129, at 36-37. The two most common situations leading to the
loss of the privilege in these cases are the following: first, a corporate officer with custody over
corporate documents who has no right to object to the production of those papers on the grounds
that they may reveal his guilt. See id. at 34 (citing Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S.
151, 158 (1923)); second, a person with possession of public documents or official records who
"has no privilege to refuse to produce them even though they contain personally incriminating
matter." Id. (citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911)); see also supraPart III.
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evidence in white-collar criminal prosecutions. In the meantime, we
are left with a vague notion of how this opportunity may take shape.
A. Has the Court Muddied the Waters?
Despite Professors Uviller and Mosteller's strong concerns, and
Professor Stuntz's mild concern, 156 the Hubbell decision does not
change the act of production doctrine much. The Court's holding in
Fisher remains largely intact. However incriminating Webster
Hubbell's tax records were in his second prosecution, the act of
producing those records would not in and of itself have involved
testimonial self-incrimination if the Independent Counsel had not
made derivative use of those documents in Hubbell's prosecution. 157
The contents of the documents formed the basis for Hubbell's
prosecution, and this use of the documents was problematic because
Starr learned of the existence of the documents only by virtue of
Hubbell's response to the subpoena. 158 Furthermore, Uviller's
suggestion that Hubbell may cause the phoenix of Boyd to stir in her
ashes 159 is misplaced. The Fourth Amendment's dictates concerning
search warrants provide that, in the event that procedural safeguards
are satisfied, the government may unilaterally violate the sanctity of
an individual's home to search for incriminating documents or
records. 160 The relevant inquiry as to whether the government has
violated an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege remains an issue
of whether or not the individual has been subjected to compulsory selfincrimination. An individual under subpoena can be incriminated in
two ways--either by incriminating oral testimony or by a response to
a subpoena duces tecum where the act of production tacitly admits
156. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 20, at 865 (noting that the Hubbell case marks "some
movement" in the direction toward making the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, not the Fourth Amendment, the primary legal shield against abusive subpoena
practice).
157. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-11 (1976); see also United States v. Doe
("Doe I"), 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment provides
absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind. The notion that the Fifth
Amendment protects the privacy of papers originated in [Boyd], but our decision in [Fisher]
sounded the death knell for Boyd.").
158. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000) ("[R]espondent's act of production
had a testimonial aspect, at least with respect to the existence and location of the documents
sought by the Government's subpoena.").
159. See Uviller, supra note 10, at 333. Specifically, Uviller expressed concern about the
renewed fusion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections articulated by the Boyd Court.
Id. at 334.
160. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 409 ("Warrants are supposed to protect citizens-when the
police have one, that usually means they did what they were supposed to do. Cases involving
warrants are the least likely to raise serious legal issues.").
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incriminating information. 161 As Professor Nagareda points out,
unreasonable seizure of incriminating documents does not itself
violate the Fifth Amendment protection from being compelled to be a
witness against oneself.162 The more persuasive view, Nagareda notes,
is that the compelled production of self-incriminating documents
independently violates the Fifth Amendment privilege, despite the
fact that it may not violate the Fourth Amendment. 163 The majority in
Boyd did not share this view. 164
B. Has Justice Thomas Muddied the Waters?
In his Hubbell dissent, Justice Thomas calls for a
65
reconsideration of the scope and meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
Specifically, what did the term "witness" mean when James Madison
wrote that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled ... to be a witness

against himself?"' 66 Was the contemporaneous understanding of the
Fifth Amendment only that no one shall be compelled to give oral
testimony against himself? Or, did the existing definition of witness
conform to the common-law definition adopted by the states at the
time of the Founding? In other words, did the definition of "witness"
include the presentation of evidence, oral or documentary, against an
67
individual?'
Justice Thomas's opinion is both controversial and thoughtprovoking. 68 His sweeping historical examination demonstrates that
the term "witness" may have had a broader meaning during the
development of the common-law privilege against self-incrimination
69
and at the time the privilege was elevated to constitutional status.
Justice Thomas provides four distinct lines of reasoning to buttress his
contention that the Fifth Amendment may protect against the
161. See Doe I, 465 U.S. at 611; see also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (explaining the basis for the
communicative aspects of producing evidence in response to a subpoena).
162. See Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1581.
163. See id.
164. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638-41 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring); see also
Sullivan, supra note 40, at 751.
165. But see Uviller, supra note 10, at 324. While he finds it "historically sound and logically
persuasive," Uviller dismisses Justice Thomas's opinion on the grounds that it would be too
difficult to convince three members of the Court to reverse the Schmerber Court's decision that
self-incriminatory physical evidence is forbidden under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (emphasis added).
167. See Uviller, supra note 10, at 324.
168. See id. ("With a long, scholarly exegesis on the original meaning of the privilege,
[Justices Thomas and Scalia] issue a warm invitation to the bar to afford the Court a future
opportunity to remake some basic constitutional doctrine-with devastating effect.").
169. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-50 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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compelled production of incriminating documentary evidence. 170 First,
Justice Thomas uses the definition of "witness" in dictionaries
published around the time of the Founding to demonstrate that a
"witness" is an individual who "gives or furnishes evidence," "gives
evidence in a case," "a giver of evidence," and "that which furnishes
evidence or proof."17 1 Employing classic textualist methodology,
Justice Thomas derives meaning from these definitions of "witness" at
the time of the Founding.1 72 Second, Justice Thomas explicates the
Anglo-American common-law definition of the term to further
illustrate the meaning at the time of the Founding.1 73 In England and
in America, the eighteenth-century "common law privilege against
self-incrimination protected against the compelled production of
174
incriminating physical evidence such as papers and documents."
Under the common law around the time the Framers outlined the
1 75
scope of the privilege, to be a "witness" meant "to furnish evidence."
Third, when the colonies drafted protections for individual
rights in the colonial constitutions, they granted a right against
compulsion "to give evidence," or "to furnish evidence," against
oneself. 1 76 Using the language from section 8 of the 1776 Virginia
Declaration of Rights as a model, seven states joined in adding this
meaning of the term to the privilege against self-incrimination during
the decade-long prelude to the Constitutional Convention.1 77 During
ratification of the Constitution, those states proposing to add a bill of
rights put forward draft provisions employing the broad protection
against compulsion "to give evidence" against oneself.1 78 In response to
these proposals, James Madison drafted the Fifth Amendment.
170. See id. at 50-56.
171. Id. at 50.
172. See id. at 50, 51 n.2; see also Charles Fried, ConstitutionalDoctrine, 107 HARv. L. REV.
1140, 1140 (1994) ("Doctrine is the work of judges and of those who comment on and rationalize
their decisions. But our allegiance and that of the judges is ultimately owed to the Constitution
itself.")
173. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 51.
174. Id. (citing Morgan, supra note 129, at 34); see also Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1620-21
(explaining that in two landmark eighteenth-century cases, the King's Bench refused to issue
orders compelling the production of self-incriminating documents, emphasizing that in a criminal
prosecution, a court may not make a man produce evidence against himself).
175. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 51-52.
176. Id. at 52.
177. See id.; see also Moglen, supra note 114, at 1118-19 (relating George Mason's seminal
formulation of individual rights embodied in the Virginia Declaration of Rights); Pittman, supra
note 139, at 787-89 (noting the nearly exact replication of Virginia's model in the rest of those
colonies adopting the privilege).
178. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 52. Justice Thomas also points to "[s]imilarly worded proposals to
protect against compelling a person 'to furnish evidence' against himself from prominent voices
outside the [constitutional] convention." Id. at 53.
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However, as noted above, Madison substituted the phrase "to be a
witness" for "to give evidence," or "to furnish evidence." 179 As Justice
Thomas and Professor Nagareda note, the absence of resistance to this
substitution strongly suggests a contemporaneous understanding of
80
the similarities between these two terms.
Finally, Justice Thomas argues that a broad understanding of
the term "witness" is consistent with the meaning of the same term in
the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause.' 8 ' In the 1807
treason trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the
right to obtain witnesses on behalf of an accused includes the right to
subpoena documentary evidence.' 8 2 The Court in United States v.
Nixon endorsed this broad interpretation,1 8 3 and in Hubbell, Justice
Thomas argues that the term's broad meaning in one clause should
have the same interpretative scope in an adjoining provision of the
Bill of Rights. 8 4 Therefore, Justice Thomas concludes that Fisher
departed from the historical backdrop of the Fifth Amendment and
rests on a flawed interpretation of the incriminatory implications of
85
responding to a subpoena duces tecum.'
C. The Response to Hubbell
Commentators have criticized the Hubbell decision, arguing
that it either misinterprets or directly contravenes the Fisher Court's
understanding of the act of production doctrine. 8 6 Professor Uviller
argues that the Court's decision in Hubbell is an improper reading of
Fisher.8 7 The proper inquiry, according to Uviller, is not whether the
Independent Counsel learned anything by reading the subpoenaed

179. Id. at 51-53.
180. See id. at 53; see also Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1607-09 (noting this understanding,
even though many of the same leaders who ratified the Bill of Rights had a hand in their states'
respective linguistic proposals).
181. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 54.

182. See id.
183. 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).

184. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 55 (Thomas, J., concurring). But see Gormley, supra note 112,
at 275 (describing President Nixon's contrary, though probably self-serving, interpretation of the
definition of testimonial evidence).
185. Id. at 56.
186. Compare Uviller, supra note 10, at 312 ("What drew my attention to the Hubbell
decision was the fact that my clear understanding of the Fisher doctrine is exactly what was
rejected by the Supreme Court, and by the nearly unanimous vote of 8-1."), with Cole, supra note
20, at 190 ("Hubbell has, at least in practical effect, overruled Fisher and restored full,
meaningful (as opposed to 'act of production') Fifth Amendment protection to most private papers
in the possession of an individual.").
187. See Uviller, supra note 10, at 326.
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documents, but whether he used the information to prosecute
Hubbell. 8 8 Fisher suggests that with his grant of immunity, Hubbell
was protected only from the admission of those documents covered by
the government's grant of Kastigar use immunity. 8 9 Uviller reads
Hubbell to mean that, in the future, "the telltale contents of the freely
recorded documents, such as inculpatory testimony, cannot be forcibly
pried from the hands of its custodian."'190 He warns that the Hubbell
decision "is disturbing for the threat it poses to the free-ranging grand
jury investigation of official corruption, financial crimes, and other
frauds."' 9' Uviller's concerns are misplaced because of his emphasis on
the breadth of the subpoena issued. Uviller acknowledges that the
subpoena issued in Hubbell was likely overbroad. 192 However, he
counters this deficiency with the fact that Webster Hubbell raised no
claim as to overbreadth and even had "the thirteen thousand pages
ready to hand over when immunity was accorded him."' 93 The problem
with Uviller's critique is that he acknowledges the constitutional
limitation on overly broad or burdensome subpoenas but does not offer
any standard for determining whether a subpoena violates this
prohibition. Presumably, Uviller would leave the determination of
overbreadth to judges on a case-by-case basis.
Professor Mosteller has also criticized the Hubbell decision
along these lines.' 94 Mosteller acknowledges that using the contents of
a subpoena may violate the privilege against self-incrimination if the
government does not know both the contents and location of the
documents at the time the subpoena is issued.195 However, in
criticizing Hubbell, he also focuses upon the breadth of the subpoena

188. See id.
189. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). If the government knows of the
existence and location of the documents, the defendant adds little or nothing to the government's
case by responding to the subpoena, and the privilege does not apply. Id.
190. Uviller, supra note 10, at 333.
191. Id. at 334; see also Cole, supra note 20, at 190-91 (noting that the subpoena duces tecum
has not lost all its investigatory power in the post-Hubbell world, because
[i]f prosecutors can show prior knowledge of the existence, location, and authenticity
of the documents, then the act of production has no testimonial value, and a court
must reject a witness's assertion of an act of production privilege. In that case, the
prosecution can obtain the documents without an immunity grant and is free to use
both the act of production and the contents of the documents to prosecute the witness.
192. Uviller, supra note 10, at 323.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors and Subpoenas for Incriminating
Evidence: The Consequences and Correction of Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (2001)

(arguing that the Independent Counsel's aggressive prosecution of Webster Hubbell led to the
damage done by the Court's decision in United States v. Hubbell).
195. Id. at 533.
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issued. 196 In articulating what Mosteller calls a "far-reaching"
implication, the Court rejected the "position that a broad subpoena
calling for production of classes of business records falls outside the
protection of the Fifth Amendment under the foregone conclusion
doctrine."'197 In other words, Hubbell was an easy way for the Court to
declare that such a subpoena is overly broad. The Independent
Counsel's "reckless litigation strategy" presented the Court with a
perfect situation to declare overbreadth of a subpoena, thereby
violating the privilege against self-incrimination.198 Mosteller
underscores his emphasis on subpoena breadth by presenting a series
of hypotheticals and demonstrating that the Court's resolution of
these cases under Hubbell depends on subpoena breadth as it relates
to the foregone conclusion doctrine. 199
Both critics of the Hubbell decision fail to effectively articulate
a judicially cognizable standard for determining the limits of subpoena
overbreadth. Instead, the decision as to when a subpoena will be broad
enough to violate the privilege against self-incrimination is left to the
lower federal courts based on the facts of each individual case. The use
of this standard-based determination in the context of compelled selfincrimination has potentially dangerous implications. As explained
below, judicial regulation of subpoena breadth allows judges to permit
a defendant to incriminate himself in the commission of a crime if the
context of the situation suggests that the subpoena in question is not
overly broad. Such judicial regulation does not comport with a
restrained interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause. A
constitutional right, which embodies a given meaning, should not be
subject to compromise under a pliable standard within a context20 0
determinative basis.
D. The Test Case
The majority of act of production cases fall neatly into the
Court's categorization in Fisher as to when the government may

196. Id. at 512-13.
197. Id. at 511-12.
198. Id. at 523.
199. Id. at 523-30. The Court discussed the foregone conclusion doctrine in Fisherv. United
States and stated that "[t]he existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and
the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by
conceding that he in fact has the papers." 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
200. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L.
REV. 22, 62-69 (1992) (outlining the competing arguments over rules versus standards in modern
Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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compel a defendant to turn over self-incriminating documents. 20 1
However, the Court has not addressed every type of white-collar
criminal case it might face in the future. Hypothetically, the Court
will be faced with a situation in which the government has a good idea
about the existence and contents of the document, but does not know
the document's location. In this case, the procedural hurdles to
obtaining a search warrant are insurmountable, so the prosecution
will use a narrowly tailored subpoena duces tecum to compel the
individual in question to turn over the documents. The issue, then, is
whether the government can use its subpoena power to compel
production of the document. As noted above, courts have struggled to
fashion a standard by which to determine if a subpoena is too broad
for the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause. 2 2 The time has
come to abandon the search for such a standard. Instead, the Court
should establish a rule prohibiting judges from making ad hoc
determinations as to which subpoenas are too broad for purposes of
self-incrimination.
In the modern world of white-collar crime, it is relatively easy
to find analogues to the test case. For example, the stock market
bubble of the late 1990s gave rise to questionable practices by
corporate directors and managers, market analysts, bankers, lawyers,
and auditors. 20 3 The increased use of electronic data storage and the
Internet have augmented the likelihood that incriminating evidence
will be saved on a hard drive or in an E-mail account. Against this
backdrop, prosecutors, defendants, and the courts face the challenging
task of addressing a situation in which the government knows that a
document exists and knows its contents with reasonable certainty, but
does not know the document's location. The test case could involve an
E-mail or a piece of paper, but the effect on the act of production and
the question raised is the same: Can the government use a narrowly
tailored subpoena duces tecum to compel the individual possessing the
document to produce it to the government? Under the Court's holding
in Fisher, the answer to this question is almost certainly yes, as long
201. See, e.g., United States v. Doe ("Doe 1"), 465 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1984). In rejecting Boyd's
notion of a "zone of privacy" protecting an individual and his personal records from compelled
production, the Court held that "[a]s we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment protects the
person asserting the privilege only from compelled self incrimination. When the preparation of
business records is voluntary, no compulsion is present." Id.
202. See supra Part II.B.
203. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B. Henriques, Enron'sMany Strands: The Company
Unravels; Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as it Rotted from Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2002, at Al (tracing the Enron Corporation's spectacular rise and spectacular fall from the time
of the inauguration of President George W. Bush to the date of the company's bankruptcy filing
on December 4, 2001).
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as the act of producing the document would not in and of itself
incriminate the individual under subpoena. 20 4 However, under the
Framers' view, the government cannot compel production of the
document in question. 205 According to this view, use of the subpoena
duces tecum to force an individual to provide evidence subsequently
admitted against that individual in a criminal trial violates the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The modern understanding of the act of production doctrine in
the wake of Fisher and its progeny therefore appears inconsistent with
the Framers' understanding of the privilege against selfincrimination. The Fifth Amendment's provision that no one may be
compelled to be a witness against himself contradicts the Court's
holding in Fisher to the extent that the decision allows the compelled
production of documents containing self-incriminatory information.
V.

THE SOLUTION

The Supreme Court should establish that the privilege against
self-incrimination, as it relates to documentary evidence, may not be
violated by even a narrowly tailored subpoena request. In
reevaluating the act of production doctrine in white-collar
prosecutions, the Court should not revive the majority opinion in
Boyd, which held that the Fifth Amendment protection runs together
with Fourth Amendment privacy interests. Instead, the Court should
undertake a reasoned effort to effectuate the Framers' intent and
establish a bright-line rule to protect the citizenry from concentration
of governmental power used to compel the production of selfincriminating documents.
A. Let the Sleeping Boyd Lie
This conclusion does not mean, however, that the Court should
revive its holding in Boyd. When the states ratified the Fifth
Amendment, they did so with the understanding that serving as a
witness included the presentation of documentary evidence. 20 6 State
representatives were conspicuously silent when Madison substituted
his own terminology, thus providing support for the notion that the

204. See Fisher,425 U.S. at 410-11.
205. See supra Part IJI.B.
206. See Ralph Rossum, "Self-Incrimination'" Original Intent, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 274-76, 281-84 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed.,
1991).
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two phrasings were considered synonymous. 20 7 Although the Boyd
Court was closer to the original understanding of the privilege than
the Fisher Court, the majority opinion in Boyd, holding that the
Fourth and the Fifth Amendment privileges run together, is incorrect.
To argue that the privilege against self-incrimination runs with the
Fourth Amendment privilege to be secure in one's home and papers
suggests that the Fourth Amendment privilege may never be pierced,
because in theory, the privilege against self-incrimination may never
be pierced. But the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment only
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 20 8 As Justice
Miller wrote in Boyd, "it is obvious that [the Framers] only intended to
restrain the abuse, while they did not abolish the power" of searching
private houses and seizing private documents and records. 20 9 Hence, it
2 10
is only unreasonable searches and seizures that are forbidden.
B. Let the Framers'IntentGuide the Test Case
Interpretation of the privilege at the time it was articulated in
the Bill of Rights demonstrates that it should not be subject to
compromise via a context-specific judicial determination. 21' According
to the history of the Self-Incrimination Clause, to be compelled to be a
witness against oneself includes being compelled to give evidence
against oneself. There is evidence that this interpretation of the
privilege extended to what we now call "white-collar" crimes. To a
certain extent, the situations contemplated by modern white-collar
prosecutors were familiar to the English and colonial governments
that helped formulate the original protections the privilege
provides. 21 2 The privilege was invoked in commercial cases as a
protection from the inquiries of a colonial government that was at that
time merely a minor regulatory state. Though the regulatory
landscape of modern white-collar crime has clearly grown more
nuanced and diverse, the principles remain similar, and there are
examples from the colonial era that demonstrate that the Framers

207. See Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1607-08.
208. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) ("[W]hat the Constitution
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures." (emphasis
added)).
209. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring).
210. Id.
211. See supra Part III.
212. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 414-15 (pointing to the eighteenth-century New
England trade laws and the cases against Boston smugglers in the 1750s).
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had some exposure to earlier versions of white-collar crime. 2 13
Although the common-law right to be free from unlawful searches and
seizures eventually developed to allow the government to gather
incriminating evidence against a defendant, the right to be free from
self-incrimination was intended to be nearly absolute. 214 Furthermore,
the rise of twenty-first-century white-collar crime provides the
opportunity for prosecutors to exert ever greater power over the
individual defendant. 2 15 Now, perhaps more so than in the past, the
time has come to reclaim the protection against the compelled
production of self-incriminating documents the Framers contemplated
in the Fifth Amendment.
Therefore, Justice Thomas's historical analysis in Hubbell is
sound: the meaning of the term "witness" at the time of the Founding
216
was broader than the Court's current understanding of that term.
But Justice Thomas stopped short of the test case described above.
Applying the Framers' intent to the test case, the government will
likely be unable to compel the individual to turn over the document,
because it would require the target of the investigation to provide a
link in the chain of evidence that could ultimately lead to his

213. See id. Stuntz compares the inquiries of the High Commission and the Star Chamber to
the same procedures used to gain access to warehouses and homes of those accused of violating
commercial trade laws. Id. He implies that the same concerns surrounding the compulsion of
self-incriminating information from a defendant in a case for heresy are present in a case for
trade violations. See id. at 414-16. For example, in 1722, New York merchants, on the advice of
London-educated counsel, resisted a statute authorizing civil and military officers in New York
to exact an "oath of purgation" from a suspect accused of trading with the French. See LEVY,
supra note 114, at 381. The merchants realized that this oath would compel them to incriminate
themselves in the violation of the trade prohibition. Id. When New York enacted a new statute
regulating the fur trade by a tax device, the oath of purgation was "conspicuously absent from its
provisions." Id.; see also Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1073 (1765)
(justifying the common-law prohibition of compelling self-incrimination as a protection for the
innocent as well as the guilty). Shortly before the American Revolution, two future presidents of
the Continental Congress, Henry Laurens and John Hancock, were accused of smuggling goods
into American ports in violation of existing customs statutes. See LEVY, supra note 114, at 39598. Laurens denounced the inquisitory procedures of the vice-admiralty courts, in large part
because of "the willingness of the admiralty judge to abridge the right against selfincrimination." Id. at 396. In Hancock's 1768 trial, his friends and relatives were examined and
reexamined, Hancock's office was searched, his desk was rifled, and his papers were seized. See
id. at 397. The local papers in Boston were outraged at the inquisitorial methods used to gather
evidence against Hancock. See id. at 398. John Adams, representing Hancock, argued that the
approach employed by the admiralty courts was abhorrent to the English common law. See id.
214. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 416 ('The claim was not that suspected heretics should be
free from compelled self-incrimination, but that everyone should be.").
215. For a brief application of the above argument to the search for encrypted documents, see
Greg Sergienko, United States v. Hubbell: Encryption and the Discovery of Documents, 7 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 31 (2001), available at http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i4/articlel.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 2003).
216. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 56 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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prosecution. Thus, the only way to obtain this document would be to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment's procedural requirements and to
obtain a warrant allowing the government to unilaterally search the
location where the document is believed to exist. This solution
provides the protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, as
well as from being compelled to be a witness against oneself. By
satisfying the procedural requirements for a search warrant, the
government may unilaterally conduct its criminal investigations
without using evidence obtained when the target of the investigation
produced the evidence in question. Moreover, greater reliance on
search warrants has certain advantages, because warrants serve as a
2 17
check on unscrupulous behavior by prosecutors and defendants.
Although search warrants require that the government use
independent means to learn about the location of the document in
order not to infringe upon constitutional rights, this approach
conforms to the Framers' conception of the appropriate protections an
individual should enjoy against the concentration and abuse of
governmental power. 2 18 Under a proper understanding of the SelfIncrimination Clause, individuals like Webster Hubbell or the
defendant in the test case would avoid being compelled to implicate
themselves in the commission of a crime.
Once the Framers' intent is recognized, the breadth of a
subpoena would no longer determine whether a request for documents
violates Fisher's foregone conclusion test. 219 Judges would be relieved
of the difficult inquiry into whether the overbreadth of a subpoenawhether or not the subpoena is a "fishing expedition"-serves to
compel the target of a criminal investigation to provide this crucial
link in the chain of evidence ultimately used against him. 220 Instead,
the use of any evidence obtained by subpoena as part of a criminal
investigation (without a grant of use immunity), regardless of the
breadth of the subpoena request, would violate the privilege against
217. See Sergienko, supra note 215.
A search warrant has the advantage, from the prosecutor's perspective, of not giving
the possible defendant notice of the documents and thereby allowing the person
subject to the subpoena to destroy the documents. The use of a subpoena duces tecum
under such circumstances seems more consistent with an unscrupulous prosecutor's
desire to get the documents and then construct an after-the-fact claim to have been
able to identify them.
218. See, e.g., Pittman, supra note 139, at 789 ('The provision of the Federal Bill of Right
sagainst compulsory self-incrimination not only was an answer to numerous instances of colonial
misrule but also was a shield against the evils that lurk in the shadows of a new and untried
sovereignty.").
219. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
220. For an argument that "Fisher'sfocus on preexisting government knowledge is highly
speculative and unwieldy to apply in practice," see Nagareda, supranote 41, at 1599.
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self-incrimination. The target of such an investigation would be
protected from being a witness against himself in the course of the
investigation, and law enforcement would be able to gather evidence
through grants of immunity and via search warrants.
Certainly, the notion that in 2003, the Supreme Court should
cast aside a settled branch of its jurisprudence in favor of a textual
interpretation that was popular in the late eighteenth century is
difficult to grasp. However, when interpreting the text and intent of
the Bill of Rights, the language must be the starting point. 221
Although blind adherence to the Framers' intent for its own sake is a
misguided approach, a constitutional doctrine should be reevaluated
in light of this intent when the current interpretation of the doctrine
operates unjustly against the citizenry. 222 In this situation, the
language and history of the Self-Incrimination Clause demonstrates
that the Court has strayed far from the Framers' view of the Fifth
Amendment with potentially dangerous results.
The judicial branch should not be permitted to compromise a
right secured to the citizenry by the Fifth Amendment. If the privilege
against self-incrimination is to have the force and effect to protect
citizens in a complex and ever changing regulatory landscape, the
meaning of the privilege, as contemplated by those who authored and
ratified it, must be accorded respect by the judiciary. By attempting to
craft a standard of subpoena breadth that will not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination, judges engage in an exercise dangerous not
only to their own obligations to follow those standards, but also to the

221. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 120, at 296 ("Granted, lawyers and judges must often go
beyond the letter of the law, but the text itself is an obvious starting point of legal analysis.").
222. Compare H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 948 (1985):

Early interpreters usually applied standard techniques of statutory construction to
the Constitution. When a consensus eventually emerged on a proper theory of
constitutional interpretation, it indeed centered on "original intent." But at the time,
that term referred to the "intentions" of the sovereign parties to the constitutional
compact, as evidenced in the Constitution's language and discerned through
structural methods of interpretation; it did not refer to the personal intentions of the
framers or of anyone else.[,]
with Fried, supra note 172, at 1152:
If what the Constitution meant were open to reinterpretation from the ground up...
if a new story could be started, a new argument made at each instance of its
application-not just by the Supreme Court, but by lower courts, state courts, and
officials at all levels-then, whatever might be said about the "correctness" of some of
these intentions, the ensemble of purportedly constitutional activities would exhibit
an incoherence that must be further from the reason for having a Constitution than
the departure worked by any particular doctrine, no matter how far afield it may have
wandered.
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rights of the accused. 223 Indeed, the very legitimacy of judicial power
depends upon effectuating the meaning of the Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION

The protections in the Bill of Rights were intended to thwart
224
the regulatory power of the newly created centralized government.
Having emerged from English rule and facing a tenuous republican
democracy, the Framers knew all too well the dangers of concentrated
power and a centralized government with excessive authority over the
citizenry. It would be wise to honor their intent and construe the act of
production doctrine in accordance with the Framers' understanding of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Judicial regulation of
subpoena breadth runs counter to this notion. The Supreme Court
should declare that, regardless of subpoena breadth, using evidence
produced by the target of a criminal investigation as a link in the
chain of evidence against him violates the privilege against selfincrimination. This bold step will secure the rights of the accused, as
well as ensure that the state's investigatory power, derived from the
consent of the governed, reflects those protections embodied in the Bill
of Rights. At the same time, interests in the rule of law will be
protected by a greater reliance on traditional Fourth Amendment
search and seizure methods. As Justice Frankfurter wrote, "[o]nce we
conceive of the rule of law as embracing the whole range of
presuppositions on which government is conducted and not as a
technical doctrine of judicial authority, the relevant question is not,
has it been achieved, but, is it conscientiously and systematically
pursued." 225 With a reasoned and measured reevaluation of the
current act of production doctrine, the Supreme Court has the

223. Madison contemplated this model of judicial restraint when he sketched the contours of
American republican government, reasoning that a republic is "a government which derives all
its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people .... It is essential to such a
government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
proportion or a favored class of it .... THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
224. See Note, OrganizationalPapers and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 640, 648 (1986) ("[F]ifth Amendment principles suggest that the regulatory rationale
alone cannot justify the distinction between personal and organizational documents. Because the
Fifth Amendment is concerned with the integrity of the process of law enforcement, its effect on
the success of prosecutions should be relatively unimportant."); see also ROBERT A. GOLDWIN,
FROM PARCHMENT TO PAPER: How JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE

CONSTITUTION 91 (1997) ("Madison concluded ...that 'the great object in view' of every bill of
rights, no matter what its form, is to 'limit and qualify the powers of Government.' ").
225. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the JudicialFunction, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 235
(1955).
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opportunity to take an important step toward realizing Frankfurter's
ideal.
Thomas Kiefer Wedeles*
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